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CONSTITUTIONAL REFLECTIONS
ON ABORTION REFORM
by Patrick L. Baude*
There is a familiar irony in the progress of many reforms. A
modest proposal-that a man should be permitted to marry his
dead wife's sister, or that spring guns should not be set in the
forest-is met with the argument that the reform principle, if
sound, should be extended to permit the apparently unthink-
able-that a woman should marry her dead husband's brother1
-or to prohibit the necessary-that a man "put glass bottles or
spikes on the top of a wall, or even have a savage dog, to prevent
persons from entering his yard." 2 The reductio is not only dis-
owned but also denounced at the time; yet the attraction of
consistency and the momentum of reform often lead those who
bitterly resented the outlandish argument to embrace it. And so
widows marry their brothers-in-law and the owners of ferocious
dogs increase liability coverage.
In the United States this self-expanding tendency of reform
sometimes appears in constitutional adjudication. For example, in
Muller v. Oregon3 the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute
limiting women's working hours in factories to ten:
"Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is proper-
ly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her
protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not
necessary for men and could not be sustained."' 4 The ten-hour
limit, valid solely for women's special needs, was upheld for men
a few years later in Bunting v. Oregon.5 Had a Justice in Muller
expressed fear of the ten-hour day for men, he might have re-
ceived the answer Professor Frankfurter, arguing Bunting, gave to
Mr. Justice McReynolds' fears that ten hours would become four:
"Your honor, if by chance I may make such a hypothesis, if your
physician should find that you're eating too much meat, it isn't
necessary for him to urge you to become a vegetarian." '6 Nonethe-
less it would today be difficult to deny legislative power to fix a
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. A.B. 1964, J.D.
1966, University of Kansas; LL.M. 1968, Harvard University.
1 See E. TURNER, ROADS To RUIN 110-35 (Penguin ed. 1966).
2 Ilott v. Wilkes, 106 Eng. Rep. 674, 680 (K.B. 1820).
3 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
4 208 U.S. at 422.
5 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
sH. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 102 (1960).
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four-hour working day; indeed the remarkable thing about the
regulatory developments touched off by Muller v. Oregon is that
the original sex discriminating Oregon statute would probably be
invalid today, on account of the very sex discrimination that
sustained it initially.
United States abortion law is evolving comparably. Even eight
years ago, public opinion was deeply divided when a Phoenix
housewife sought to avoid giving birth after taking Thalidomide. 7
The Model Penal Code, promulgated that year, authorized abor-
tion in cases of felonious intercourse, to avoid deformity, and to
protect the physical or mental health of the mother;" these faintly
daring innovations are now in danger of being declared uncon-
stitutional because they are too limited. In the last year, three
courts have invalidated moderate abortion statutes 9 and the New
York legislature has permitted abortion at will in early preg-
nancy.10 The purpose of this article is to trace the way slight
reform has made radical innovation inevitable.
The first of the recent cases invalidating a conventional limited
abortion statute arose in California. a The defendant, an "eminent
physician," was consulted by a then unmarried couple distraught
by the woman's pregnancy. Although the physician at first re-
sisted their tearful pleas, he finally decided to help when they
convinced him that the woman would have an illegal abortion
anyway. The physician's motivation, according to the court, was
simply to save the woman from the enormous medical risks of
"butchery in Tijuana or self-mutilation." ' 12 So the patient was
given the name of a Los Angeles man licensed to practice medi-
cine in Mexico but not California.
The California Penal Code, amended while the case was on
appeal, then provided:
7 See S. Finkbine, Lesser of Two Evils, in CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 15-25
(A. Guttmacher ed. 1967).
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
9 Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970); United States v. Vuitch, 305
F.Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), proc. juris. postponed, 397 U.S. 1061 (1970), parties
requested to brief procedural questions, 399 U.S. 923 (1970); People v. Belous, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
10 "An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a
duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to
preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her preg-
nancy." Similar provisions apply to the woman's own efforts. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.05 (3) (McKinney 1970).
11 People v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1970).
12 80 Cal. Rptr. at 356, 458 P.2d at 196. The defendant's life-saving state of mind could
have been relevant in applying the California statute's exemption for cases where abortion
is "necessary to preserve" the woman's life. It is thus not surprising that Justice Burke,
dissenting, chose to emphasize disputed evidence that the defendant from time-to-time
received referral fees from an illegal abortionist. 80 Cal. Rptr. at 367, 458 P.2d at 207.
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Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any
woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug,
or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the mis-
carriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to
preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not less than two nor more than five years.13
The defendant was convicted in superior court, but the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute void for vague-
ness.
The offensive statutory phrase was "necessary to preserve the
life." According to the court, the only clear meaning that could be
given the phrase would limit it to situations where the woman was
certain to die if pregnancy were not terminated. Such a saving
construction was unacceptable for two reasons: (1) the woman's
constitutional right to live would be infringed and (2) legislative
intent would be frustrated.
The weight to be given the first reason depends on whether the
second can be taken seriously. The court found legislative intent,
not in the records or language of the legislature, but in three
earlier cases of the California Court of Appeals. The first of those
cases was People v. Ballard.14 As the California Supreme Court
in Belous described that case: "[T]he evidence established that
the woman was 'extremely nervous ... upset, had headaches, was
unable to sleep, and thought that she was pregnant. She was
agitated, disturbed and had many problems.' "15 However true
this may be, the California Supreme Court should perhaps add
that the Ballard court understandably relied on the fact that the
only gynecologist (the defendant) who examined the woman con-
cluded that she was not pregnant at the time of surgery -in other
words, the prosecution failed to establish that the act was an
abortion rather than the removal of the placenta remaining after a
miscarriage.
The second case discussed in Belous was a subsequent prose-
cution against Dr. Ballard.' 6 This time the doctor treated two
women who, according to the supreme court's summary in
Belous, were in a " 'bad state of health' because of self-imposed
abortive practices.' 7 One might easily be led to believe that
Ballard II had authorized an abortion to preserve the woman's
13 CAL. LAWS 1935, ch. 528, § I, at 1605.
14 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959).
1580 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199, citing People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d at
813-14, 335 P.2d at 211.
16 People v. Ballard, 218 Cal. App. 2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1963).
1780 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199.
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life from the risks of clumsy efforts to abort herself (here turpen-
tine pills, Lysol and soap). But again, the basic holding was that
the women were not pregnant, and therefore that the doctor's
actions were not "procuring the miscarriage:"
It was ascertained from the two women who testified that at
the time each of the women went to the doctor they were not
pregnant, that each of them had had a miscarriage and each
was in a bad state of health because of self-imposed abortive
practices. There is no evidence to the effect that the doctor
thought or believed either or both of the women to be preg-
nant. In fact the evidence is to the exact contrary.' 8
It then becomes puzzling to assess the court's observation in
Belous that "[aifter the decision in Ballard [I or II?], the legisla-
ture did not amend the statute to repudiate the rule suggested by
that case and to establish a definition requiring certainty of
death."' 9 It is not obvious why the legislature would be stirred to
action by two cases deciding that a non-abortion is not an abor-
tion. It is perhaps surprising that the legislature did not act to
relieve the prosecution's proof problems by making the removal
of a dead fetus incriminating under certain circumstances. 20
The third court of appeals case used to find legislative intent
in Belous was People v. Abarbanel, 21 where, at least, the court
did determine that an abortion had occurred. In Abarbanel the
defendant physician performed the abortion after referral from a
psychiatrist who judged that the woman might otherwise commit
suicide. Such a holding, not disturbed by the legislature, might, as
the Belous court suggested, indeed refute the construction that
"necessary to preserve the life" meant "to prevent certain death."
The difficulty with asking so much of A barbanel is that the legisla-
ture can hardly be said to have acquiesced for a long period in the
construction: the statute in question was repealed at the next
regular session of the legislature, 22 while Dr. Belous' appeal was
pending.
The point of examining the efforts of the court in Belous to
reject the "to prevent certain death" construction is not to show
that the California Supreme Court, like other courts, can read
58 218 Cal. App. 2d at 307, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
1980 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199.
2 0 See G. WILLIAMS, SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 191 (1957).
21 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965).22 The A barbanel case became clear authority only when the California Supreme Court
denied rehearing, on 16 February 1966. The legislature, already in regular session, ad-
journed on 4 April. The 1967 regular session adopted the Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950 to 54 (West Supp. 1967), patterned on the MODEL
PENAL CODE, supra note 8.
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previous cases perversely. It is rather to emphasize the signifi-
cance the court must have placed on its alternative ground that
the woman's constitutional right to live would be infringed should
the court hold that the "to prevent certain death" construction
was constitutional. In making this argument the court assumes
that "it is clear that the state could not forbid a woman to procure
an abortion where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth
would be death." 2 3 Yet the basis of this principle must be that the
fetus is not "equivalent to the born child," 2 4 for if the fetus were
treated as an ordinary person, it is far from clear that the mother
could kill it to save her own life. Self-saving sacrifice of another
has never been an easy problem.2 5
The court then concludes that the woman's constitutional right
to life encompasses the physician's right to save the woman not
only from certain death, but also from high risk:
Moreover, a definition requiring certainty of death would
work an invalid abridgment of the woman's constitutional
rights. The rights involved in the instant case are the woman's
rights to life and to choose whether to bear children.2 6
This argument proves too much. If there is a constitutionally
protected right to choose whether to bear children, exercisable by
more than contraception or abstinence from sexual intercourse,
there is an end to laws punishing abortion (by licensed physi-
cians). Vague or clear, harsh or weak, they are invalid; yet the
court refuses to reach that conclusion directly.
Difficulties also result from the court's conclusion that the state
denies the "rights to life" by requiring the woman to expose
herself to less-than-certain risks of death. Yet, citizens are some-
times forced to assume such risks, as in military conscription or
prudent rules limiting the use of lethal force in self-defense. The
risks involved in the draft, or self-defense, are of course necessary
to serve governmental objectives officially perceived to be impor-
tant. But whether the fetus is "equivalent to a born child" or not,
the state can certainly claim some important interest in controlling
its destruction; it is not pure fancy to assert as great a state
interest in unborn children as in burglars.
The court then should not be understood to rely directly on the
right of the woman to life or her choice whether to bear children.
Those rights serve -principally to require that the language of a
2 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 458 P.2d at 203.
24 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363, 458 P.2d at 203.
2See Regina v. Dudley. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas.
360 (No. 15. 383) (E.D. Pa. 1842).
26 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 458 P.2d at 199.
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statute affecting them be subjected to unusually strict scrutiny.
Thus the real issue remains vagueness, and it remains a theo-
retical possibility that artful drafting could produce a valid moder-
ate abortion statute. The court has already determined (1) that
abortion must be permitted where death in childbirth is certain
and (2) that it must also be permitted in other circumstances
(presumably high-risk pregnancies). It would seem simple for the
court to announce what the Constitution requires, and then to
construe the statute accordingly. The problem is that the con-
stitutional limits are just clear enough to enable the court to
perceive the statute's vices, but just vague enough to prevent an
appropriate recasting statute. Apparently any construction more
permissive than "to obviate certain death" but less than "death
more likely from childbirth than abortion" is necessarily cast in
terms like "substantially or reasonably," and is therefore vague.
The court indicated a "childbirth more dangerous than abortion"
test would be clear, but too far removed from the language of the
statute; that test might be derived from the current California
statute's permission for abortion where there is "substantial risk
that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physi-
cal or mental health of the mother." '27
There are, however, two grave defects with a statutory rule
permitting abortion where childbirth would be more dangerous to
the mother. First, there is some evidence that unrestricted abor-
tion is safer than normal childbirth. For every one hundred thou-
sand live births in the United States, there are twenty-eight mater-
nal deaths. 28 Some countries with permissive abortion codes have
lower death rates from abortion; Czechoslovakia's death rate has
been put at 3.1 per 100,000 abortions, 29 and Hungary's rate may
be even lower. On the other hand, Denmark's rate is 41 per
100,000, and Sweden's is comparably high. It is obviously impos-
sible to place great reliance on these figures, given different stan-
dards of reporting, generally differing levels of mortality from all
causes, and inescapable problems of self-selection. It is possible
that women who seek abortions are bad medical risks due, for
example, to psychiatric complications or previous difficulties in
childbirth. But it is equally possible that women who seek legal
27 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (c) (1) (West Supp. 1967).
28 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 55
(90th edition, 1969).
2 A. Cernoch, Experiences in Czechoslovakia with the Effects and Consequences of
Legalized Artificial Termination of Pregnancy (unpublished paper), cited in D. CALLA-
HAN, ABORTIONLAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 46 n.51 (1970). A complete survey
varying national experiences may be found in D. CALLAHAN, supra 31-47; that survey is
the basis of the figures given in the text.
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abortions are good medical risks for normal pregnancy, due to
their social class or their willingness to accept medical care.
Present evidence concerning abortion deaths in the United States
is certainly useless to predict death rates under liberalized
schemes since abortions are now, in theory at least, legally au-
thorized for women who face medical or psychiatric difficulties. 30
In short, it is now impossible to disprove the proposition that
"[liegal abortion.., in the early months is safer than carrying a
pregnancy to term." 31 If this conclusion is sound, the California
Supreme Court's suggested limiting construction is meaningless.
Abortion allowed only when the risks of childbirth are greater
would always be allowed.
The second defect with the California court's proposed limiting
construction is that it imposes an intolerable burden upon the
physician. In the individual case, the physician cannot reasonably
be expected to rely upon statistical predictions to determine
whether the childbirth or the abortion is more dangerous. Yet, the
test would require a physician to balance the complex and in-
conclusive data, at pain of felony for misjudgment. The facts
surrounding the physician's judgment, then, at least establish an
uncertainty (read "vagueness") as great as that in the original
California statute.
There is thus no way, consistent with its own reasoning, to stop
the Belous case short of invalidating all conventional laws punish-
ing abortions undertaken by licensed physicians. An entirely
different legislative scheme might, however, have greater success:
abortions could be allowed only upon prior judicial or adminis-
trative order. Problems of vagueness would be eliminated for the
physician, although related new issues would be created32 and
administration would prove either costly beyond reason or arbi-
trary beyond the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Belous case was followed by a federal district court which
found unconstitutionally vague the District of Columbia's ex-
ception for abortions "necessary for the preservation of the moth-
er's life or health." 33 The addition of "health" to "life" was the
principal difference from the California statute; that difference
3 0 Contemporary medical techniques, however, have made normal childbirth possible
despite a wide variety of physical diseases which would once have been sufficient medical
cause for termination of pregnancy. See generally G. WILLIAMS, SANCTITY OF LIFE AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 167-69 (1957).
31 M. Potts, LegalAbortion in Eastern Europe, 59 EUGENICS REV. 235 (1967).
32 Such as discretionary administration and "defiance of unlawful authority."
33 United States v. Vuitch, 305 F.Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), prob. juris. postponed,
397 U.S. 1061 (1970), parties requested to brief procedural questions, 399 U.S. 323
(1970).
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could scarcely clarify the statutory language if one already found
it vague. Its principal function might be to introduce the puzzles
of psychiatric indications. For example, what of a woman who
threatens to commit suicide rather than bear a child? 34 And what
of the obvious fact that a woman who wants an abortion will be
unhappy if it is denied? One can easily foresee that the same
process which transmutes larceny by the rich to kleptomania will
describe a wealthy woman's prospective unhappiness as neu-
rosis.3 5 The only fault in the district court's opinion is its accep-
tance of the oblique approach of Belous and, perhaps, the dis-
ingenuousness of its ritual, "[t]he Court cannot legislate." 3 6
A second federal district court has refused to follow the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Three judges found that "men of common
intelligence" need not guess at the meaning of Wisconsin's "nec-
essary to save the life of the mother."37 Instead, after citing the
Supreme Court's recent birth control38 and miscegenation3 9 deci-
sions to establish an "inherently personal right" in certain private
decisions, the court concluded "that a woman's right to refuse to
carry an embryo during the early months of pregnancy may not be
invaded by the state without a more compelling public necessity
than is reflected in the statute in question." 40 In concluding that
the state's interest is not compelling, the court surprisingly finds it
unnecessary to deny that the unquickened embryo is a "human
being." 41 Thus, the Wisconsin district court at least adopts will-
ingly the result that seems the inevitable but disclaimed con-
sequence of Belous: that to be constitutional, the statute must
allow all abortions. The social utility of the particular result, and
of the practice of reaching similar results by judicial decision, are
questions fully aired elsewhere.
34 Allowed: People v. Abarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965).
Denied: Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N.W. 380(1891).
35 Future challenges, if necessary, may succeed on grounds of economic discrimination;
at any rate, the theory is clear if the evidence is "sketchy." The "further contention that
the statute disciminates against the poor and in its present operation denies medical help in
city hospitals but is more liberally applied in some private hospitals has considerable
support in the sketchy statistics and other data presented. The statute has received
differing interpretations in the hospitals. In the light of the Court's ruling, however, there is
no reason why the statute cannot henceforth be evenly applied throughout the city in a
way which removes the principal basis for existing uncertainty and confusion. National
and local policy provides free medical care for the poor. It is legally proper and indeed
imperative that uniform medical abortion services be provided all segments of the popu-
lation, the poor as well as the rich. Principles of equal protection under our Constitution
require that policies in our public hospitals be liberalized immediately." 305 F.Supp. at
1035.
36 305 F.Supp. at 1035.
37 Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.Supp. 293, 298 (E.D. Wis. 1970).38 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
40310 F.Supp. at 301.
41 310 F.Supp. at 301.
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It is however worth noting the ease with which the court finds
that the state has no compelling interest in preventing the death of
what it considers human beings. The opposite result may be
reached with equal implausibility. Professor Louisell concludes
that the Constitution prohibits a state from allowing freely chosen
abortions. 42 He reaches that conclusion from the premise that an
unborn child is a person and therefore entitled to equality of
protection with others.
It is not difficult to argue that unborn children are persons. The
reception of the genetic code at conception is probably the most
influential single event in shaping the human characteristics of an
adult.43 Add to the scientific importance of conception the ethical
values of reverence for life and the practical weight of the law as
teacher: is it comfortable to insist that physicians and mothers
may kill the fetus simply because they so desire. But it is no easier
to insist that we bear human reverence for life simply because
science calls it life. Reverence for life and humanity may indeed,
as Louisell argues, be what offers hope for man's future. Yet we
must make our own decision what to revere; neither genetic nor
federal codes can define the beginning of democratic community.
The irony of the matter is that constitutional litigation, ordinar-
ily thought of as a brake on radical revision of legal values, has in
this instance operated to prevent consensus on moderate com-
promise. 44 If one extreme must be chosen, the near future lies
with the Wisconsin district court. The general prohibition of abor-
tion is too closely linked with policies of population growth,
masculine domination, and concealment of sexual urges, to sur-
vive in an openly erotic and overcrowded society of equal men
and woman.
Much can be said for irreducible minima of governmental de-
cency; 45 much can also be said for laws of inclusive general-
ity.46 Yet to require that one person be given certain rights (the
neurotic woman must have an abortion if she wants), and then to
scrutinize severely a different course for a different case (the
unwilling mother), is too powerful. Still, the wisest course may not
42 D. Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 233 (1969); D. Louisell & J. Noonan, Constitutional Balance, in
MORALITY OF ABORTION (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
4 See generally J. Noonan, A bortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary History, 12
NATURAL L.F. 85 (1967).
44 A similar point is made in R. Dixon, Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of
"One Man-One Vote," 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 219.
4 F. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
46 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (concurring opinion
of Jackson, J.).
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be for the courts to force the sexual and population revolutions
faster than tentative moral accommodation in the legislature per-
mits. 47 But perhaps Rousseau's "Good laws make better ones,
bad laws make worse" is more accurate than Voltaire's "The best
is the enemy of the good."
47 Judicial activism may engender legislative passivity in a variety of ways. For example,
fear of becoming an interstate "abortion mill" may deter a state from liberalization of its
laws. Thus Georgia's version of the Model Penal Code adds: "No abortion is authorized
or shall be performed under this section unless each of the following conditions is met: (1)
The pregnant woman requesting the abortion certifies in writing under oath and subject to
the penalties of false swearing to the physician who proposes to perform the abortion that
she is a bona fide legal resident of the State of Georgia. (2) The physician certifies that he
believes the woman is a bona fide resident of this State and that he has no information
which should lead him to'believe otherwise." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202 (b) (1968).
Similar restrictions were enacted by North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1969).
These residence requirements are vulnerable in light of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), holding that Connecticut may not deny welfare to residents during a one-year
waiting period. The Shapiro rule has been applied to medical treatment for indigents, and
the extension to abortion seems likely. Board of Supervisors v. Robinson, 457 P.2d 951
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), vacated as moot, 105 Ariz. 280, 463 P.2d 536 (1970). See
generally R. Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C. L. REV. 730, 774-75 (1968); Residence
Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 134 (1970).
Shapiro could be distinguished because it involved discrimination between new and old
residents rather than residents and non-residents. The distinction seems trivial at first, but
suggests a more important issue-can some states experiment in legislative policy without
forcing their experiments on neighboring law-makers? Unrestricted mobility poses some
threat of a Gresham's law for state legislation. The issue may remain academic, since the
resident of a restrictive state would be more likely to seek an abortion in New York than a
lawsuit in Georgia. The plaintiff, if there is one, should not forget to point out the
vagueness of "residency," whose possible meanings range from "temporarily sleeping" to
"domiciled."
